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DISTRIBUTIONS IN KIND IN CORPORATE
LIQUIDATIONS: A DEFENSE OF GENERAL UTILITIES
Richard C.E. Beck*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a long-standing principle of the corporate income tax system that no tax
is imposed on a corporation di~tributing appreciated property to its shareholders
in kind. Generally referred to as the General Utilities' principle, this basic rule
of nonrecognition originally applied to all distribut.ions in kind to shareholders.
Congress has repeatedly restricted its .range of applic!ltion through the years,
however, so that General Utilities now remains operative almost exclusively in
the area of liquidating distributions.
Several legal and governmental bodies have recently advanced proposals for
complete legislative repeal of General Utilities and have advocated imposition
of a corporate level tax on all distributions in kind qf appreciated property, even
in liquidations. Although not without merit, such proposals would create more
problems than they would· solve. The proposed tax on unrealized appreciation
violates a fundamental principle underlying the income tax system and is even
more difficult to justify on practical grounds. In effect, the proposed extension
of corporate level tax to liquidations would result only ·in double taxation of the
corporate shareholders. The resulting rate of tax on shareholders receiving liquidating distributions would be higher than under the present collapsible corporation provisions of section 341. Transfers of businesses into and out of
corporate form would be pointlessly deterred 'by the increased rate of tax.
The reform proposals would also repeal section 337 so that sales of appreciated
corporate property followed by liquidation would be taxable at the corporate
level. A section 338 election to treat a stockpurchase as a deemed asset purchase
would therefore also trigger a tax UpO~· an acquired subsidiary. These changes
would dramatically increase the aggrega~e tax cost of both sales of assets and
sales of stock, and would compel reliance qli the tax free reorganization provisions as the only remaining practical means of disposing of an appreciated
business.
·
Extension of a corporate level tax to liquidating distributions woµld especially
affect small
businesses,
and the.tax would be unacceptably burdensome
unless
.
.
.

.

*Richard C.E. Beck (B.A., University of Chicago, 1963; ·Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1973;
J.D., Yale Law School, 1980; LL.M. (in Taxation), New )'ork University School of Law, 1984)
is a member of the New York Bar and an associate with the firm of Rogers & Wells, New York,
New York.
·
The author is indebted to Robert E. Frisch, senior tax partner of Rogers & Wells, for his generous
support and invaluable advice.
1General Utilites & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
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relief measures are enacted. Although some General Utilities critics have proposed relief measures, such proposals are either jnadequate or unworkable.
Abandonment of th~ General Utilities principle also ~oul~ create new traps
for the unwary that could be avoided only through en~ctment of still other relief
provisions. Such problems indicat~ .that repeal of General Utilities might ultim~tely complicate the law rather than s.imP,lify it. The most compelling argument
for repeal of General Utilities is that it would permit elimination of the collapsible
corporation rules. But solving the collapsible corporation problem by repeal of
General· Utilities is unnecessary. The ·collapsibility problem is caused more
immediately by the fact that shareholders receive basis in corporate inventory
assets distriputed in liquidation equal to the fair market value thereof. It is this
rule that should be changed, rather than the rule of General Utilities .
. . This article proposes an 'alternative rule. The proposed rule would require the
basis and character of corporate inventory assets to be carried over into shareholder ha~ds. Adoption of this carryover rule would permit both repeal of the
collapsible corporation rul~s and retention of General Utilities. In contrast both
to current law and to proposals for repeal of General Utilities, the carryover
provision proposed here would cause gain. from appreciated corporate property
to be taxed only when actually realized, only to the t~xpayer who realizes the
gain, and only at the appropriate rate.
II. BACKGROUND

A. General Utilities & Operation Co. v. Helvering
On January l, 1927, General Utilities & Operating Co. acquired 20,000 shares
of common stock in the Islands Edison Company for a purchase price of $2,000. 2
One year later, a prospective buyer offered General Utilities more than $1,000,000
for its Edison stock. 3 Although General Utilities was interested in the offer, its
president pointed out that a sale of the Edison stock directly by General Utilities
would result in an initial tax on the· gain at the corporate level, as well as a
second tax at the shareholder level if the corporation distributed the sales proceeds. 4 In order to avoid the corporate level tax, General Utilities distributed
the Edison stock to its shareholders as a dividend in kind. 5 Four days after
receiving the shares, all of the General Utilities shareholders sold their Edison
stock to the original offeror on terms similar to those first presented to the
corporation. 6
The Service attempted to impose a corporate level tax on the grounds that
declaration of the dividend created a debt of the corporation to its shareholders,
which General Utilities discharged by distributing the Edison stock. The Service
argued that thi_s discharge of indebtedness triggered income to General Utilities
2

/d. at 201.
at 202-03. ·
4
/d. at 202.
3/d.

'Id.
6/d.

at 230.
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equal to the excess of the fair market value of the Edison stock over its adjusted
basis in the hands of the corporation. 7
The Board of Tax Appeals rejected the Service's argument, finding that there
was no indebtedness to be discharged because General Utilities had not declared
a dividend in a dollar amount. 8 The Service prevailed in its appeal to the Fourth
Circuit by raising the new argument that the transaction was in substance a sale
by.General Utilities and the shareholders were acting as its agents. Thus, General
Utilities was held to be the true seller and gain from the sale of the Edison stock
was treated as realized directly by the corporation. 9
The Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth Circuit had improperly considered
the "true seller" argument because the issue had not been raised at trial before
the Board of Tax Appeals. 10 The Commissioner raised another argument for the
first time before the Supreme Court, contending that a dividend in kirid is a
taxable "disposition" of the distributed property and causes realization of gain
or loss to the distributing corporation. The Supreme Court did not discuss this
argument but simply held that the dividend of Edison stock to the General Utilities
shareholders did not constitute a sale and that assets were not used to discharge
indebtedness. 11 Thus, by implication, the decision holds that a dividend in kind
of appreciated property does not trigger any tax consequences to the distributing
corporation.
B. Codification of General Utilities
Although the Supreme Court's decision in General Utilities was concerned
only with a dividend distribution, the case has become synonymous with the
principle that no gain or loss is recognized by a corporation through a distribution
of appreciated property, whether in liquidating or nonliquidating distributions. 12
This principle was first codified in 1954 with the enactment of sections 311 and
336. As originally enacted, these sections provided exceptions only for distributions of installment obligations,· and for distributions of LIFO inventory and
property subject to liabilities in excess of basis in nonliquidating distributions. 13
Since then, however, Congress has amended the sections several times and has
substantially limited the scope of the General Utilities doctrine. 14 As a result,
1/d.

at 204 (citing Kirby Lumber Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 1 (1931)).
B.T.A. 934, 940 (1934).
.
974 F.2d 972, 976 (4th Cir. 1935).
1°296 U.S. at 206.

8 29

11/d.
12
See, e.g., Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evol..<ion and
Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 130 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Clark].
13See l.R.C. §§ 3ll(b), (c), 336 (1954).
141n the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 905, 83 Stat. 487 (1969), Congress
added section 31 l(d) which, subject to certain exceptions, triggers gain recognition on the redemption
of stock with appreciated property. In 1980, Congress enacted section 336(b) as part of the Crude
Oil Windfall Profits Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 403(b)(l), 94 Stat. 229, 304 (1980). This
section extends the recapture rule for LIFO reserves to liquidating distributions. In the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 222(c}, (d}, 223(a}, 96 Stat. 324,
478-79, 483 (1982), Congress extended the scope of section 3ll(d) and limited nonrecognition
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the nonrecognition principle of General Utilities remains in force today only for
complete liquidations, certain partial liquidations, and dividends of "qualified
stock."

C. Senate Finance Committee Report
On September 22, 1983, the Staff of the Senate Finance Committee released
a report (Staff Report) 15 which discusses a wide variety of corporate income tax
issues and advances a number of proposals to amend the Code in the name of
simplification and reform. 16 Some of the proposals would affect the most basic
structure of the corporate income tax. Among them is a proposal to repeal the
nonrecognition rules for distributions in kind of corporate property in partial and
complete liquidations, and for sales of corporate property in twelve-month liquidations under section 337. 17 The Staff Report also recommends repeal of
nonrecognition treatment for dividends in kind. 18 The Staff Report refers to all
of the above mentioned nonrecognition rules as the General Utilities principle.
Apparently as a result of the Report's influence, a repeal of the General Utilities
principle with respect to dividends was enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act
of 1984 (TRA 1984). 19
Following issuance of the Staff Report, the American Bar Association Section
of Taxation formed a special Task Force to review the Staff Report proposals
regarding General Utilities. The report issued by the Task Force (Task Force
Report) 20 agreed with the Staff Report and likewise recommended repeal of
General Utilities, but made an exception for long-held capital and section 1231
assets. 21

treatment on distributions pursuant to a partial liquidation. Finally, in the Deficit Reduction Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 54(a), 54(d), 712(j), 98 Stat. 568, 569, 948 (1984), Congress again
amended section 31 l(d)(2), and in so doing virtually eliminated the General Utilities principle for
dividend distributions. Apart from a new exception for "qualified dividends" with respect to "qualified stock" to noncorporate shareholders of property that is not inventory or receivables and has
been used by the distributing corporation in the active conduct of a five-year trade or business, gain
must now be recognized on all current distributions in kind of appreciated property.
1
'See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 98TH CONG., !ST SESS .• THE REFORM AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS (Comm. Print No. 95, 1983) [hereinafter cited
as STAFF REPORT].
1
6The Staff Report's arguments are largely amplifications of earlier ones advanced in the American
Law Institute Subchapter c Project. See FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: SUBCHAPTER c PROPOSALS
ON CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS (American Law Institute 1980) [hereinafter cited as
ALI PROJECTJ.
17STAFFREPORT, supra note 15, at 66-67.
18
1d. at 76.
' 9See supra note 14 (Deficit Reduction Act eliminated General Utilities for dividend distributions).
20
Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, Task Force Report, Income Taxation of Corporations Making Distributions with Respect to Their Stock, 37 TAX LAWYER 625 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as Task Force Report].
21
1d. at 631. A Minority Report of the Task Force disagrees, but only to the extent of allowing
complete exemption for capital and 1231 assets rather than requiring a three-year holding period.
The Minority Report would tax liquidating distributions of appreciated inventory and other ordinary
assets to the distributing corporation. Id. at 638.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 38, No. 3
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Academic commentators also appear to be unanimous in support of complete
repeal, as mitigated by various relief proposals. 22
Before any further rollback is enacted, however, the consequences of a tax
system without General Utilities should be carefully considered, and alternative
approaches should be weighed. There is no need for haste, even in the view of
the reformers. The Staff Report, which contains the longest list of arguments
favoring repeal of General Utilities, cites no abuse under current law that requires
immediate correction. 23
The Staff Report's arguments are designed to establish two conclusions-(1)
that the benefits of the General Utilities principle are too generous and (2) that
the General Utilities principle is out of harmony with the general scheme of
corporate income taxation, and for that reason has caused unnecessary complication of the law.
With respect to the first conclusion, it is noteworthy that the Staff Report
expects such harsh consequences from repeal that it recommends measures for
taxpayer relief. 24 Furthermore, even under one of the relief proposals, the Staff
Report predicts a revenue loss in the early years after repeal of General Utilities
because taxpayers will avoid liquidations in kind. 25
As for the second source of dissatisfaction with General Utilities, the Staff
Report makes no claim that repeal would permit the elimination of even a single
statutory complication purportedly caused by General Utilities. 26 The existing
welter of recapture rules for tax credits, depreciation, and prior tax benefits
would all remain in effect for sales and other dispositions, and seemingly still
would be applicable to in kind distributions in liquidation as well. Furthermore,
although the collapsible corporation rules under section 341 would be eliminated
for domestic coq)orations, they would continue to be applicable to foreign corporations. 27
Elimination of the collapsible corporation rules under section 341 is a worthwhile goal and it can be accomplished through repeal of General Utilities. It is
not necessary, however, to give up the benefits of General Utilities in order to
repeal section 341. The collapsible corporation problem involves conversion of
ordinary income into capital gain, rather than avoidance of tax at the corporate
22See, e.g., Block, Liquidations Before and After Repeal of General Utilities, 21 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 307 (1984), which is at once the most recent and the most thorough review of the issue;
Blum, Behind the General Utilities Doctrine, Or Why Does the General Have So Much Support
from the Troops?, 62 TAXES 292 (1984); Blum, Taxing Transfers of Incorporated Businesses: A
Proposal for Improvement, 52 TAXES 516, 522 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Blum); Clark, supra note
12, at 130; Lewis, A Proposed New Treatment for Corporate Distributions and Sales in Liquidation,
3 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 1643 (1959) (Committee on Ways and Means) [hereinafter cited as
Lewis].
23
See generally STAFF REPORT, supra note 15.
24
1d. at 93-94. The proposed relief measures include a phase-in of the additional tax liability over
time or a shareholder credit for the corporate level capital gain tax,
251d. at I07-08.
26See STAFF REPORT, supra note 15.
27
1d. at 89.
28
See infra text accompanying notes 93-96. See generally Ginsburg, Collapsible CorporationsRevisiting an Old Misfortune, 33 TAX L. REv. 309 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Ginsburg].
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level. 28 A more direct solution would be to insure that corporate business profits
are taxed at least once at ordinary income rates. The proposal made below woµld
accomplish this goal by ( 1) requiring carryover of the corporate transferor's b_asis
in distributed ordinary income assets in all liquidations and section 338 elections,
and (2) requiring shareholder gain from section 337 sales to be recognized at
ordinary income rates to the extent that cash that represents untaxed corporate
business profits is distributed. This proposal is perfectly consistent with retention
of General Utilities.
III. CURRENT LAW

A. Complete liquidations
Under current law, pursuant to section 336(a), no gain or loss is recognized
by a corporation on a distribution of property in complete liquidation. 29 The
primary effect of section 336 is to eliminate potential tax at the corporate level
for built-in appreciation of corporate property. 30 Shareholder distributees are
treated under section 331 as having sold or exchanged their stock for the property
distributed and are taxed at capital gain rates on the difference between the basis
in their stock and the fair market value of the property received. 31 If shareholders
recognize gain or loss on receipt of the property, their basis in the property is
its fair market value at the time of distribution pursuant to section 334(a). Thus,
taxpayers recognizing gain receive a stepped-up basis in the distributed assets,
thereby enabling them to enjoy larger depreciation deductions with respect to
depreciable property or, if the property is nondepreciable, lower taxable gains
upon resale. 32
B. Partial liquidations
Sections 31l(d)(2)(A)(i) and 302(b)(4) provide a nonrecognition rule for corporate distributions of property in kind pursuant to a partial liquidation. 33 In
29
Exceptions to the nonrecognition rule are found in section 4538 relating to disposition of
installment obligations and in section 336(b) pertaining to recapture of LIFO inventory. In addition,
the recapture rules for investment tax credits and depreciation under sections 4 7, 1245, and 1250
override section 336 and may trigger income or gain to the distributing corporation as a result of
an in kind distribution in liquidation.
30
Nonrecognition under section 336 applies equally to losses, but corporations can enjoy recognition of losses simply by selling the depreciated assets rather than distributing them in kind.
31
1.R.C. § 33 I.
32
Although a single tax at the shareholder level is the general rule, shareholders can defer recognition of all or part of their gain by electing a one-month complete liquidation under section 333.
As a price for this deferral, however, the shareholders must take a substituted basis in the distributed
property equal to their basis in the stock redeemed. l.R.C. § 334(c). Noncorporate shareholders'
gain is recognized and treated as a dividend, however, to the extent of their ratable share of corporate
earnings and profits, and is recognized as capital gain to the extent money and post-1953 stock and
securities exceed earnings and profits. l.R.C. § 333(e). A corporate shareholder's gain is recognized
only to the extent of the greater of money and post-1953 stock and securities received or its ratable
share of earnings and profits. Id.
33
Nonrecognition of gain for in kind distributions in partial liquidation of an S corporation has
not been available since enactment of section 1363(d), as added by the Subchapter S Revision Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, § 2, 96 Stat. 1669 (1982), applicable to tax years beginning after
1982. Nonrecognition treatment remains available, however, for complete liquidation of an S corporation under section 1363(e).
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order to qualify for such .nonrecognition treatment, the distribution must be to
a noncorporate shareholder and with respect to "qualified stock" as defined in
section 311 (e )( 1). 34 Shareholder distributees are treated as having sold their stock
to the corporation under section 302(a), and therefore they obtain a cost basis
under section 1012 equal to the fair market value of the distributed property.
For partial liquidations, no gain deferral election is available under section 333.

C. Asset Sale

Follow~d

by Liquidation-Section 337

Section 337 permits nonrecognition treatment for corporate sales of property 35
pursuant to a twelve-month plan of liquidation in order to conform the tax results
of a corporate liquidation followed by shareholder sale of property with the
results of a corporate sale of property followed by liquidation. Section 337 does
not apply to partial liquidations, to liquidations under section 333 ("one-month"
liquidations), or to collapsible corporations. 36
D. Section 338
A purchaser of 80% or more of the stock of a corporation is permitted to step
up the aggregate basis of the target corporation's assets to the purchase price of
the stock by making an.election under section 338. 37 The section 338 election
permits the target corporation to be treated as if it had made a section 337 sale
of assets to itself without the necessity of liquidating. It is designed to afford
panty between stock purchases and asset purchases with respect to the basis of
the target corporation's property.
IV. THE GENERAL UTILITIES DOCTRINE IS NOT OVERGENEROUS
The Staff Report argues that the General Utilities doctrine is overgenerous in
two ways-(!) it permits appreciation accrued during the time the corporation
owned the property to escape taxation at the corporate level, and (2) it permits
assets to be depreciated twice without the price of a corporate level tax. 38

A. Corporate Level Unrealized Appreciation Should Not be Tf!Xed
The issue actually addressed in the General Utilities case was whether the
distributing corporation had first declared a dividend in a fixed dollar amount,
thereby creating a corporate debt that was then discharged with appreciated
property. 39 The law before and after General Utilities clearly provided that an
in kind distribution of assets to shareholders does not, by itself, cause realization
of gain or loss to the distributing corporation. The origins of this nonrealization
34See
3

I.R.C. §§ 3Il(d)(2)(A)(i), 302(b)(4)(A).

~Exceptions to the nonrecognition rule of section 337 exist for inventory (except in bulk sale)

and certain installment obligations. See l.R.C. § 337(b). Additionally, the recapture provisions of
sections 47, 1245, and 1250 override section 337 nonrecognition.
361.R.C. § 337(a), (c).
37
1.R.C. § 338(d)(3).
38
See STAFF REPORT, supra note 15, at 88-91.
39
See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
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rule are traceable to explicit regulations issued as far back as 1919. 40 The rule
of General Utilities was, and remains, in complete harmony with the general
scheme of the Code, which requires some realization event before income can
be recognized and a tax imposed. 41
Why should a corporation be taxed on a distribution of property to shareholders
as if a sale or exchange had taken place? A corporation's receipt of its own stock
in exchange for assets in liquidation should not be regarded as consideration. 42
In complete liquidations, tender of stock for redemption is usually a meaningless
gesture because the stock will be cancelled when the corporation is dissolved.
In substance, the same is true of a pro rata redemption in partial liquidation
because tender of the stock simply reduces the amount of stock outstanding and
has the effect of a reverse stock split.
The Staff Report argues that, in economic substance, a distribution of appreciated property to shareholders is the equivalent of a corporate level sale of the
property, followed by a distribution of cash, and therefore should not be taxed
differently. 43 The Staff Report also provides an example in which the shareholders sell appreciated securities for cash immediately after distribution to them
by the corporation. 44
If the transaction in the example could be accomplished under current law
without corporate tax, the Staff Report would be justified in calling for some
remedy of the abuse. 45 In such a scenario, however, when shareholders sell
distributed property immediately after receipt, the courts can apply the rule of
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co. 46 in order to ignore the in kind dividend
distribution for tax purposes and attribute the sale to the corporation. 47
4(JSee Regs.§ 45 (1919): "No gain or loss is realized by: a corporation from the mere distribution
of its assets in kind upon dissolution, however they may have appreciated or depreciated in value
since their acquisition."
41
See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (stock dividend not a realization of gain).
42
Cf. l.R.C. § 1032 (corporation does not recognize gain or loss on receipt of property in exchange
for own stock). See generally Manning, The Issuer's Paper: Property or What? Zero Basis and
Other Income Tax Mysteries, 39 TAX L. REV. 159 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Manning].
43
STAFF REPORT, supra note 15, at 89.
44
/d. The Staff Report's example is a dividend, which is generally no longer appropriate due to
the amendments to section 3ll(d)(2) by TRA 1984. See supra note 14. The example would not
have the same force for liquidations because section 337 immunizes a corporate level sale from tax
if its conditions are met and therefore, it would make no difference who sells the appreciated
securities. The Staff Report's example does appear to retain its point, however, for partial liquidations,
"qualified dividends," and distributions of stock or obligations of a controlled corporation under
.
sections 3ll(d)(2)(A) and (B), respectively.
45
The Staff Report's perception of abuse in General Utilities' failure to tax unrealized appreciation
at the corporate level seems based upon an unstated and implausible assumption that the only purpose
of in kind distributions, even in partial or complete liquidation, is to place liquid assets in the hands
of shareholders. See supra text accompanying notes 15-28. The Staff Report fails to consider the
importance of General Utilities for situations in which the purpose of liquidation is to remove the
business or businesses from corporate form so that they can be conducted in a proprietorship,
partnership, or trust. See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text (changing corporate form).
46
324 U.S. 331 (1945) (upheld finding that sale by shareholders ofliquidating dividend of property
actually sale by corporation). The Court Holding principle survives the enactment of section 337 in
situations other than when section 337 applies. See, e.g .• Cohen v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 527
(1975), afj'd in unpublished opinion, (3d Cir. 1976) (section 333 liquidation).
47
Although in General Utilities the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's "true seller"
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 38, No. 3
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If, on the other hand, the shareholders do not immediately sell the distributed
property, the economic equivalence argument is strained. The distributing corporation should not be taxed as having made a sale because it never enjoyed the
use of any sales proceeds. In order to avoid imposition of a corporate level tax,
the corporation must both divest itself of the property and renounce any economic
benefit that might flow to it from the divestiture. The shareholder distributees
will not have received the economic equivalent of a distribution of cash because
they continue to hold the property and bear the uncertain risks and rewards of
ownership until ultimate disposition.
Unless confined to the circumstances of an immediate post-distribution sale,
the "economic equivalence" argument proves too much. Indeed, such an argument would seem to justify taxing all unrealized appreciation, whether or not
a distribution occurs. Mere retention of appreciated assets can be regarded as
economically equivalent to selling them at year end (or, for that matter, at the
close of business each day) ~nd immediately repurchasing them. 48 Despite the
arguments of economists, 49 however, Congress has left largely intact the requirement of a realization event before an income tax can be imposed on property
appreciation, 50 whether the requirement is one of constitutional dimension or
merely a rule of administrative convenience. 51
In its repeal of General Utilities with respect to dividends, Congress seems
to have accepted the "economic equivalence" argument only for distributions

analysis on the grounds that it had been i;aised only on appeal, see supra note 10 and accompanying
text, the case appears to be a classic one for the application of the Court Holding principle. Subsequent
cases have held for the Service on precisely this point. See, e.g .. Bush Bros. v. Commissioner, 73
T.C. 424 (1979), aff d, 668 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1982) (dividends in kind of appreciated futures
contracts sold by shareholders on same day of receipt held sales attributable and taxable to corporation).
The Court Holding rule is essentially an assignment of income principle and is not limited to
corporation-shareholder transactions. A transfer of appreciated property as a gift, for example, after
the donor has arranged a sale that the donee is expected to complete, may be taxed to the donor on
the same principle. See, e.g., Usher v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 205 (1965). It does not follow from
such cases that gifts of appreciated property should be treated generally as realization events, much
less that such gifts are merely a disguised substitute for gifts of cash.
48Certain futures contracts are treated in just this fashion under the mark-to-market rules of section
1256.
49See Goode, The Economic Definition of Income, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION I (Brookings 1977) (widely accepted "Haig-Simons" definition of income would include unrealized appreciation).
50'fhe case of United States v. Davis presented an analogy to the tax-without-realization that would
result from reversal of General Utilities. In Davis, the Supreme Court held taxable a husband's
transfer of appreciated property in exchange for the release of inchoate marital claims in a common
law divorce. This analogy is no longer valid, however, because Congress repealed Davis by enacting
section 421(a) of TRA 1984. See l.R.C. § 1041. It is curious that both Davis and General Utilities
were reversed in TRA 1984, thus preserving an apparent inconsistency. See Hawkins, A Discussion
of the Repeal of General Utilities, 37 TAX LAWYER 641, 643 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Hawkins].
Hawkins further notes the inconsistency in asking Congress to reverse both decisions, which it
subsequently did, at least in part. Manning, supra note 42, at 177-78, 185.
51 See generally B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, EsTATES AND GIFTS 5-16 to 5-22
(1981).
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 38, No. 3
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in kind that seem likely to serve as a substitute for cash dividends. 52 For in kind
distributions of property that seem likely to be used by shareholders in a continuation of business, Congress has retained the prior nonrealization rule by
enacting the exception for "qualified dividends. " 53 From a theoretical point of
view solely of whether there is a corporate realization vel non, there may be no
difference between "cash substitute" and "qualified dividend" types of distribution. Congress evidently believed, however, that non-qualified dividends in
kind should no longer be accorded the benefit of non-realization treatment, on
the grounds that they are presumptively motivated only by tax advantage rather
than by any business purpose. The distinction between tax motivated and business
motivated current distributions seems well founded from a policy point of view, 54
although the relevant provisions are unfortunately complex and arbitrary.
B. Double Taxation
The Staff Report states that although a tax on the transfer of all of a corporation's assets in a complete liquidation may seem an unfair application of two
taxes to a single transaction, no justification exists for granting liquidations
special relief from the corporate level tax. 55 The Staff Report does acknowledge
that repeal of the present non-recognition provisions. would worsen the effect of
the current high rates of combined corporate and individual taxes. For that reason,
the Staff Report states that taxpayer relief measures may be necessary. 56 The
Staff Report also acknowledges the undesirability of extending a questionable
double tax to transactions that have not been subject to such a burden before. 57
The double tax on liquidating distributions arising from repeal of General
Utilities would be unsound for a number of other reasons that are not considered
in the Staff Report.

I. Basis Problems-Deterrents to Incorporation
Suppose an individual incorporates his apartment house in a tax free transaction
under section 351. If at the time of incorporation· the property has a basis of $10
in the individual's hands and a fair market value of $100, the corporation will
s2see STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITIEE ON TAXATION' 98TH CONG.' 2D SESS.' GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEACIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 149 (Jt. Comm. Print 1984)
(Staff Report's examp.l~ repeated) [hereinafter referred to as the Blue Book]. Although the Blue
Book.~xplains that "[t]he theory of.secti?n 311 is that the distribution of appreciated property to a
~hareholder is a realization event," id., what Congress actually did is just as consistent with the
opposite theory that it is a non-realization event, with the exception of dividends.that (presumptively)
can· have no other purpose than tax advantage since the property will (presumptively) not be used
in a continu.ation of business, and so might just as well have been sold first and the cash procei;ds
distribµted .instead. .
·
.
s31.R.C. § 31 l(d)(2)(A)(ii). In order to qualify, the dividend must be distributed to a noncorporate
shareholder who has held 10% of the stock of the distribuiing corporation for five years, and the
propef!y must be capital or 1231. assets used in the active conduct of the. corporation's trade or
business for the previous five· years. l.R.C. § 31 l(e)(I ), (3).
s4see .s.upra note 45, and infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text (change of business vehicle).
SSSTAFF REPORT' supra note 15' at 90-91.
s6/d. at 92-93. This relief could include reducing the corporate tax rate generally or phasing-out
the General Utilities principle. Id. at 93-94.
S?Jd. at 92.
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take a transferred basis of $10 in the property, and the individual willreceive a
substituted basis of $10 in his stock. 58 If the shareholder later decides to liquidate
the corporation and take the property back into proprietorship form, he ~an do
so in two ways under current law. He can pay a single capital gain tax at the
shareholder level on $90 of gain and take the property back with a basis stepped
up to its fair market value of $100. 59 Alternatively, he can elect a section 333
liquidation and substitute his stock basis.of $JO as his basis for the building. No
payment of tax would result, and, ignoring section 1250 recapture, the taxpayer
would emerge in the same position as prior to incorporating.
If General Utilities is repealed, however, the corporation will be taxed on the
$90 of appreciation that occurred before the corporation owned the property.
However, unless section 333 deferral is elected, when the shareholder receives
the property he will be required to pay a capital gain tax on the same appreciation. 60 Should the corporation lack cash to pay the tax, the shareholder may
actually be worse off than if the corporation had sold the property in a recognition
transaction and distributed the cash. Preincorporation appreciation might be protected from corporate level tax through a special relief measure, but such a
solution would necessitate valuing all property transferred at the time of incor"
poration. The administrative costs of such valuation and the probability of later
disputes with the Service would appear to make such a relief measure impractical.
In a tax system without General Utilities, it would often be inadvisable to
transfer appreciated property to a corporation in a section 351 nonrecognition
transaction. Well-advised incorporations of appreciated property would be more
likely to be effectuated through a taxable sale to the corporation. A taxable
incorporation, however, cannot be accomplished by a sole incorporator without
incurring a tax at ordinary income rates under section 1239. 61 Such tax disincentives to incorporation seem undesirable. 62
2. Barrier to Exiting from Corporate Form
Tax policy should generally be neutral regarding changes of the form in which
a business is conducted by the taxpayer. For that reason, nonrecognition rules
are provided to allow tax free transfers of business assets between business
vehicles when continuity of ownership is present: 63 The Gene.rat Utilities principle furthers this transferability of business form. By providing for nonrecog58 See

J.R.C. §§ 362(a), 358(a).

59

See J.R.C. §§ 331(a), 334(a).

60'fhis problem was noted in Lewis, supra note 22, at 1649.
61 Section 1239 treats any gain on a sale or exchange of depreciable property between a shareholder
and his 80% or more owned corporation as ordinary income.
62
1t is true that under current law pre-incorporation appreciation may be taxed if the corporation
makes a nonliquidating sale of the appreciating property. But there is no reason to add to the
situations in which this unfortunate result may obtain.
63 For example, business assets can be put into partnership form tax free under section 721 and
removed again tax free under section 731. Similarly, business assets can be incorporated tax free
pursuant to section 351 and, if a fair market value basis is not desired, shareholders may (with
certain restrictions) elect to take the assets (with a substituted basis equal to that of the redeemed
stock) and to d.efer recognition of gain under section 333.
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nition of gain at the corporate level for liquidating distributions, the rule permits
shareholders to liquidate the corporation and to elect to continue the business in
proprietorship, partnership, or trust form without the imposition of a tax as a
deterrent. A new corporate level tax upon liquidations in kind would operate as
a toll charged for the privilege of exiting the corporate form. Such a toll is not
supported by sound tax policy.

C. In Complete Liquidations Corporate Tax Falls on Shareholders
The Staff Report asserts that nonrecognition of unrealized gain in liquidating
distributions appears to be a forgiveness of tax at the corporate level. 64 In reality,
however, the shareholders indirectly pay a tax on the corporate property appreciation under current law because the appreciation is reflected in the increased
value of their stock and is taxed when the shareholders realize gain in a liquidating
distribution. Even if the corporation pays the proposed new tax as a matter of
form, the tax will not fall on the corporation, which ceases to exist, but on the
very same shareholders who must immediately pay another capital gain tax on
the same appreciation at the shareholder level. If the corporation pays the tax
itself, the shareholders will receive pro tanto smaller liquidation distributions
just as if a tax on the shareholders were withheld from their distributions. If the
corporation does not pay the tax, the shareholders will inherit the corporation's
tax liability either explicitly through distribution of an actual obligation, or
through transferee liability as successors in interest to the corporation. 65 Consequently, the new tax that would arise from repeal of General Utilities can be
said to be at the corporate level only in the sense that the tax wiil be measured
at the corporation's tax rate. As soon as the tax is measured, it will fall upon
the shareholders either as a reduction of their liquidation proceeds or as their
direct obligation.
The reformers purport to repeal General Utilities in order to maintain the
integrity of the present two-level system of corporate and shareholder taxation.
Whatever justification there may be for the two-level tax, however, its purpose
can hardly be served unless both levels of taxpaying entities are in existence. A
going corporation may be regarded as having an economic life distinct from that
of its shareholders, particularly if ownership is dispersed. In liquidation, however, any distinction between the economic interests of a corporation and its
shareholders collapses, for the simple reason that the corporation disappears.
The tax proposed by the Staff Report would extend the double tax to transactions that have never been subject to the double tax before. 66 At a time when
the double taxation system itself is being widely questioned and ways of mitigating its effects are being studied in the United States67 and implemented in
64

See STAFF REPORT, supra note 15, at 76.
MSee l.R.C. § 6901 (transferee liability).
See STAFF REPORT, supra note 15, at 91.

66

67
Indeed, the extension of the double taxation system to liquidations seems inconsistent with the
recent Treasury Department Report to the President that presents a proposal for partial relief from
double taxation of dividends. The proposal states that the ''double taxation of dividends discourages
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other industrial countries, needless extension of the system seems to constitute
a particularly poor policy.
D. Particular Burden Placed upon Small Business
An in kind liquidation of a going business into a partnership or proprietorship
form would almost certainly not be effected by a public corporation. Business
of a certain magnitude and complexity virtually dictates the use of corporate
form. In any event, wide dispersal of stock ownership would appear to make
such a transfer difficult even if it seemed desirable. 68 Therefore, the extra tax
burden arising from complete repeal of General Utilities apparently would fall
entirely upon close corporations, and most likely upon the smaller ones. 69
Shareholders of small, closely held corporations are often not, as a practical
matter, subject to the full burden of a double level tax. Because many shareholders of closely held corporations also serve as employees of the corporation,
they can often enjoy profits in the form of salaries which are deductible to the
corporation rather than in the form of nondeductible dividends. The effect of
the proposed tax could not be cushioned in the same manner as the tax on a
going concern, however, because liquidation of a corporation terminates the
management's employment. Inflicting the proposed tax in the name of maintaining the integrity of the two-level tax system seerris ironic in the case of close
corporations, since the double tax would have to be paid in full in liquidations
alone. Furthermore, the payment would be due upon a distribution in kind which
may not produce cash proceeds with which to pay the tax.

E. The Proposed Double Tax Contravenes the Policy of Capital Gain Relief
and Would Lock in Investments
The preferential rate of tax afforded to long-term capital gains can be at least
partly justified by the theory that it alleviates the effect of "bunching" into a
single year taxable gain that may have resulted from appreciation, real or inflationary, over a long period of time. Repeal of General Utilities would contravene
this well established form of tax relief by imposing, in the typical situation, a
double capital gain tax at the same time on the same property appreciation. At
least for close corporations, this is probably the usual situation because if corporate assets have greatly appreciated, the shareholders generally can be expected
to have a low basis in their stock reflecting pre-appreCiaiion value of the corporate

savings and discriminates against investment in the corporate sector." U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, TAX
REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND EcONOMIC GROWTH xiii (1984) [hereinafter cited as U.S.
TREASURY DEP'T]:
.
68
0f course, a public corporation can first be bought into private hands, for example through
leveraged buyout. Such transactions are seldom made to liquidate corporate business into noncorporate form, ·however.
6
9When repeal of section 337 is also taken into account, however, the new tax would affect
corporations of all sizes.
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assets. 70 The effect of combined capital gain taxes produces a 42.4% rate of tax
on shareholders. 71 For items taxed at ordinary income rates at the corporate level,
the rate of tax on shareholders rises to 56.8%. 72 At these rates, one may expect
that taxpayers will simply avoid liquidations in kind. 73 ·
Both the Staff Report and the Task Force Report would repeal section 337
together with General Utilities. 74 This is necessary in order to preserve parity
of tax treatment for liquidations in kind and for sales of assets in liquidation. 75
It follows that a section 338 election causing a deemed asset sale would also
trigger a tax at the level of the acquired subsidiary. As a result, the tax cost of
any liquidation, asset sale, or stock sale of an appreciated business ·that yields
a cost basis to the transferee would become prohibitively expensive. Dispositions
of incorporated appreciated businesses would probably take place _through the
reorganization provisions, or not at all.

F. Need for Shareholder Adjustments Inter Se
If a shareholder buys his shares after a corporation's property. has already
appreciated substantially, another sort of inequity may occur. In a complete
liquidation, the Staff Report would impose upon the shareholder, as successor
in interest to the corporation, a portion of the corporation's tax on appreciated
property for appreciation that occurred when he was not a shareholder. 76 The
shareholder would thus be taxed on gain which is, as to him, illusory. Fairness
would seem to require that each shareholder bear only that portion of the corporate
tax that reflects appreciation relating to the period during which he was a shareholder. 77 This suggests the need for a provision to adjust the basis of corporate
700ne of the principal assumptions upon which the Staff Report is premised is that capital gains
will continue to be taxed at substantially lower rates than ordinary income. STAFF REl'ORT, supra
note 15, at 4. On the other hand, the Treasury Department's recent proposal would tax capital gains,
subject to indexation, in the same manner as ordinary income. U.S. TREASURY DEPT, supra note
67, at lO I. The two proposals thus seem inconsistent.
71
The 42.4% rate is the 28% corporate net capital gain tax rate plus 14.4%. The 14.4% is the
maximum individual capital gain tax· rate of 20% (40% of the capital gain times the 50% maximum
individual income tax rate) times the amount of the distribution, which is 72% (100% less the 28%
paid at the corporate level).
72
The 56.8% rate equals 46% (the maximum corporate income tax rate) plus I0.8%. The 10.8%
is the 54% distribution to the shareholder (100% less 46%) times the maximum individual capital
gain rate (40% times 50%) of 20%.
73
The Staff Report expects just that. STAFF REl'ORT, supra note 15, at 107-08.
14
See supra text accompanying notes 17, 21.
73If section 337 were not also repealed, a corporation could sell all its assets to its shareholders
without tax at the corporate level, and then distribute their money back in liquidating distributions.
The result would be the same as if General Utilities remained in effect.
16
See STAFF REl'ORT, supra note 15, at 66.
77
This problem can be alleviated partially by adjustment of the price the purchaser is willing to
pay for his stock in order to take into account the built-in tax liabilities. Estimating the present value
of such liabilities, however, would require estimating the life span of the corporation until liquidation
or sale, which is probably not contemplated at all at the time a shareholder purchases his stock.
The problem of inequity among shareholders would be somewhat less difficult for non pro rata
distributions in partial liquidations that completely or substantially redeem some shareholders, leaving
the other shareholders as the sole or principal remaining owners of the reduced corporation. In that
case, the proposed tax on corporate level appreciation would be borne exclusively, or at least
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property with· respect to a new shareholder for the purpose of calculating his
share of corporate gain or loss from liquidating sales or distributions. The provision might work like the optional adjustment to basis of partnership property
under section 743(b). 78
Similarly, with respect to contributions of appreciated property to corporations,
new provisions may be necessary to adjust the burden of the Staff Report's
proposed tax between shareholders. These provisions would perhaps be similar
to the adjustment required under section 704(c) for contributions of appreciated
or depreciated property to a partnership·. 79 Otherwise, taxable gain or loss from
built-in appreciation or depreciation could be artificially, or more likely, accidentally shifted among shareholders. Obviously, these adjustments would result
in additional complexities in the Code.

G. Double Depreciation
The Staff Report states that the General Utilities doctrine "often leaves taxpayers better off, on balance, than they would be if no corporate level tax were
imposed.' ' 80 This conclusion is not supported explicitly by argument or example,
but seems to be based upon the proposition that, following an in kind distribution
of appreciated property that was depreciable by the corporation, the shareholders
may depreciate the property again. It is the normal pattern of the Code, however,
to permit depreciation of already depreciated assets each time they are transferred
to a different taxpayer, provided the transferee legitimately acquires a cost or
other basis upon which to begin depreciation anew. 81
The Staff Report argues in several places that the price of a step up in basis
should always be a tax at the corporate level. 82 The argument seems to be based
upon an analogy to the tax free reorganization provisions under which a transferee
of assets generally receives no step up if the transferor pays no tax. 83 However,
the analogy is .misleading because in a tax free reorganization, the transferee
also pays no tax. In a liquidating distribution, on the other hand, the shareholder
is treated as making a taxable exchange. under section 331.
principally, by the remaining shareholders, and the redeemed shareholders who receive the property
triggering the tax would escape the new tax altogether. This inequitable result could be mitigated,
however, by reducing the amount of property distributed, that is, by reducing the redemption price.
In this situation, the calculation of the reduction of the amount to be distributed could be made with
more accuracy because the date of the tax liability, and hence its present value, would already be
known.
78
Section 743(b) provides that the basis of partnership property to a purchaser of a partnership
interest shall be increased by the excess of his basis in the partnership interest over his proportionate
share of the adjusted basis of the partnership property if the election under section 754 is in effect.
79Section 704(c) provides that income, gain, loss, and deductions with respect to property contributed to a partnership by a partner shall be shared among partners so as to take into account the
variation between the basis of the property to the partnership and its fair market value at the time
of contribution.
80
STAFF REPORT, supra note 15, at 88.
81
See I.R.C. §§ 167(g), 1012.
82
STAFF REPORT, supra note 15, at 33, 61, 89-90.
83
See generally I.R.C §§ 354-368.
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In a taxable sale or exchange it is generally irrelevant to the buyer's basis
whether the seller has paid a tax or not. The buyer's basis is his cost, and it is
wholly independent of the seller's basis. Under current section 331, a shareholder
must pay a tax in order to enjoy a step up in basis of distributed assets. The
effect of the tax is the same as if the shareholder had first sold his stock for a
taxable gain and then used the J!roceeds to purchase the assets at fair market
value, thereby obtaining a cost basis.
The Staff Report's treatment of section 333 liquidations seems inconsistent
with its position that the price of a basis step up should always be a corporate
level tax. 84 Under current law, if a shareholder's basis in his stock is lower than
the fair market value of the distributed property, he may elect to defer recognition
of gain under section 333 at the price of a substituted basis for the property
received. 85 The Staff Report would allow a similar relief provision, 86 but would
still require extraction of the proposed tax at the corporate level, despite denying
the shareholder a stepped-up basis in exchange.
V. COLLAPSIBLE CORPORATIONS AND SIMPLIFICATION
OF THE CODE
The Staff Report claims that Congress has repeatedly limited the General
Utilities doctrine in order to eliminate unintended benefits and argues that repeal
of General Utilities altogether would eliminate the source of many present and
future complexities. 87 Examples provided in the Staff Report include the investment tax credit and depreciation recapture rules of sections 47, 1245, and
1250, recapture of LIFO inventory, 88 and the tax benefit rule. 89 These limitations
on General Utilities, however, do not reflect congressional dissatisfaction with
the rule itself. 90
The recapture provisions call for repayments of tax benefits actually enjoyed
by a corporation in the form of credits or deductions in prior years. They do not
constitute in any sense partial payments of a tax on unrealized appreciation that
the corporation never received or enjoyed. Moreover, the Staff Report cannot,
and does not, claim that any of the complex limiting rules could be completely
removed from the Code as a result of repeal of General Utilities. 91 The recapture
rules apply generally to sales and other dispositions and are not limited to
corporate distributions of property in kind. 92
84 STAFF REPORT, supra note 15,
8
~See l.R.C. §§ 333(a), 334(c).

at 15.
A section 333 liquidation can also produce a stepped-up basis if
the fair market value of the distributed property is. less than the shareholder's basis in his stock. The
step up would be to the higher stock basis, not to'fair market value. However, such a step up would
be at the cost of foregoing a capital loss otherwise immediately recognizable under section 331.
86
See STAFF REPORT, supra note 15, at 93.
87
/d. at 33, 88.
881.R.C. § 336.
891.R.C. § 111.
90
See Hawkins, supra note 50, at 645.
91
See generally STAFF REPORT, supra note 15.
92
See 1.R.C. §§ 47, 1245, 1250.
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In fact, under the Staff Report proposals, the recapture rules would still appear
to apply even to General Utilities transactions. For example, section 1245 recapture would seem to apply a fortiori to a distribution of appreciated equipment
once a decision is made to tax the distribution as if it were a sale. A special
provision would be required to prevent application, but none is suggested in the
Staff Report. Thus, repeal would produce very little reduction in the complexity
of the Code, except for possible repeal of the collapsible corporation rules under
section 341. 93

A. Collapsible Corporations
Section 341 was first enacted in 1950 _as section 117(m) of the 1939 Code in
order to close a perceived loophole through which taxpayers· appeared to be able
to convert ordinary business profits into long~term capital gain. 94 In its simplest
form, the collapsible corporation scheme works as follows. A corporation is
formed, for instance, to subdivide and develop real estate. After completing
development but before making a sale, the corporation liquidates and distributes
its inventory of developed property to its shareholders in kind. The corporation
is not taxed due to General Utilities, and the shareholders pay a capital gain tax
but receive the inventory with basis stepped up to fair market value. When the
shareholders sell the inventory they will have little or no taxable profit due to
their stepped-up basis. The result is that a single tax has been paid at capital
gain rates on business profits that should have been taxed at least once at ordinary
·
income rates. 95
The principal abuse in these situations is that neither the corporation nor its
shareholders pay any tax at ordinary income rates. Had the shareholders conducted the business in proprietorship form without the corporation, they would
have been taxed at ordinary income rates on inventory profits. By temporarily
using a corporation, however, the shareholders are taxed only at the lower capital
gain rates. Section 341 prevents the collapsible corporation ploy· by taxing at
ordinary income rates the shareholder who sells stock of, or receives a liquidating
distribution from, a collapsible corporation. 96 Although the goal of section 341
93
The Staff Report somewhat surprisingly states that even after repeal of General Utilities, section
341 would still be required for foreign corp<irations. See STAFF REPoRT, supra note 15, at 81.
94See B. BmKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
12-3 (4th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as B. BmKER & J. EUSTICE].
95 In a variation on this scheme, the shareholders might sell their stock at the cost of a single
capital gain tax, and the buyer could step up the basis of the inventory to the price paid for the
stock through a section 338 election, thereby wiping out most or all of the built-in taxable gain.
96Code section 341 (b )(I) provides in part:

(b) DEFINmONS.(1) COLLAPSIBLE CORPORATION.-For purposes of this section, the term "collapsible
corporation" means a corporation formed or availed of principally for the manufacture,
construction, or production of property, for the purchase of property which (in the hands
of the corporation) is property described in paragraph (3) [roughly: inventory, receivables, and certain property used in trade or business], or the holding of stock in a
corporation so formed or availed of, with a view to-
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is obviously a sound one, dissatisfaction with the provision has been widespread
since its enactment, and the provision has been amended numerous times. 97 The
trouble comes not merely from the statute's "pathological degree of complexity, " 98 but also from its fundamental conception.
Section 341 is not as much a taxing provision as it is a penalty, and its
application is too blunt and its reach too uncertain to serve in any other
capacity. The shareholder is taxed at ordinary income rates on a sale of stock
of, or a liquidating distribution from, a collapsible corporation regardless of
the possibility that some of the corporation's built-in gain may be due to
assets that would have produced capital gain had they been sold either by the
corporation or by the shareholder conducting business without the use of a
corporation. 99 Furthermore, the collapsible definition depends upon a vague
and uncertain subjective test of the taxpayer's "view"-a test that has in
t_errorem value for a penalty tax, but is inappropriate for any other purpose.
The problems of section 341 are well kriown and need no rehearsing
here. 100
Elimination of section 341 would be possible if General Utilities were
repealed. The collapsible corporation rules also could be eliminated, however,
by repeal of the preferential rate of tax on capital gains 101 or by repeal of the
corporate income tax in its entirety. These changes would, of course, be
inappropriately far-reaching for so incidental a purpose. Similarly, General
Utilities should not be repealed for the sole purpose of eliminating section
341 from the Code. General Utilities is too valuable a rule, and repeal is too
drastic a change, for the small result intended. The collapsibility problem
involves not as much an avoidance of corporate level tax as it does a conversion
of ordinary income to capital gain. Therefore, the imposition of a new double
tax which would cause the difficulties discussed above is not the preferable
way to solve the problem. Rather; a mechanism. is needed to insure that
ordinary business profits are always taxed at one level as ordinary income.

(A) the sale or exchange of stock by its shareholders (whether in liquidation
or otherwise), or a distribution to its shareholders, before the realization by the
corporation manufacturing, constructing, producing, or purchasing the property
of 2/3 of the taxable income to be derived from such property, and
(8) the realization by such shareholders of gain attributable to such property.
97
Section 341(b)(l)(A) was most recently amended by striking out "a substantial part" and
inserting in lieu thereof "2/3." Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 65(a), 98
Stat. 494, 584.
98
ALI PROJECT, supra note 16, at 111.
99See Braunstein v. Commissioner, 374 U.S. 65 (1963), in which shareholder gain on sale of
stock was held to be ordinary income because the collapsible corporation definition was met, even
though sale of the underlying apartment project would yield long-term capital gains if no corporation
had been utilized. In Braunstein, the rules worked backwards and converted capital gains into ordinary
income.
100
see Ginsburg, supra note 28.
1
io Indeed, the Treasury Report gives this as one reason for eliminating the capital gains preference.
See 2 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, supra note 67, at 187.
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VI. INADEQUACY OF TAXPAYER RELIEF PROPOSALS
The obvious problems with the proposed repeal of General Utilities have led
the reformers to recognize the need for relief of some kind. 102 Relief is particularly necessary when appreciated capital and section 1231 assets that would
have been taxed at capital gain rates if sold by the corporation (capital gain
assets) are involved. That relief provisions are necessary at all does not bode
well for the proposed tax. More discouraging is that the proposals published to
date are insufficient even for relief from the double capital gain tax result, and
provide no relief at all from the double tax on ordinary income assets. Tinkering
with relief provisions will not fix a bad tax and is likely to lead only to complex
and unworkable law. Tax reformers would do well to remember that section
34l(e), which is perhaps the most byzantine and incomprehensible section in
the entire statute, was enacted in part to provide relief from very similar problems
of overtaxation caused by a tax that was poorly designed in the first instance. 103
A. Relief for Long-Held Capital and Section 1231 Assets
The Task Force Report proposes the simplest relief - no tax would be imposed
on capital gain assets that have been held by the corporation for three years. 104
The Minority Report, however, correctly objects to the arbitrary nature of the
three-year safe harbor, which seems to have been inspired by the very same
collapsible corporation rules that the repeal of General Utilities is designed to
.eliminate. 105 The three year safe harbor will do nothing to rescue shareholders
who engage in an improvident incorporation of appreCiated assets; at best such
shareholders would have to wait three years before liqilidating.
.
Furthermore, this relief proposal would be inadequate because it is limited
1
on ly to capital gain assets. For distributions of ordinary income assets, the
effective tax burden on the shareholders of a corporate level ordinary income
tax plus a shareholder level capital gain tax would reach 56.8%, 106 a rate which
exceeds the present maximum rate of tax under section 341. If shareholder capital
gain were short-term, the rate of tax under the proposal would reach 73%. 107
B. Relief in the Form of Substituted Basis
The Staff Report's favored proposal for taxpayer relief after repeal of General
Utilities would allow distributees to elect to substitute their stock basis as the
basis in the assets distributed and thus postpone shareholder level tax on any
102

See, e.g., Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 632.
& J. EUSTICE, supra note 94, at 12-26.
.
'°"Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 633. The Task Force Report also recommends exceptions
to the proposed corporate level tax for distributions of corporate goodwill and distributions of all of
the stock of a controlled subsidiary owned by the distributing corporation. Id. at 626.
105
See id. at 638 (Minority Report).
•06see supra note 72 (calculation of 56.8%).
107
The 73% equals the maximum 46% rate applicable to corporate short-term capital gains plus
27%. The 27% equals the amount of the after-tax shareholder distributfon which is 54% (100% less
46%) times the maximum individual tax rate for short-term capital gains of 50%.
103

B. BITIKER
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gain in exchange for foregoing a step up in basis. 108 The Staff Report seems to
ignore that a section 333 liquidation under current law permits the same deferral
of shareholder level tax in exchange for a substituted stock basis in the distributed
assets. Thus, the "relief" proposed appears to be already in place. The net effect
of the repeal and relief proposals seems to be the addition of a corporate level
tax to section 333 liquidations. The deferral policy underlying section 333 would
be utterly defeated because, as argued above, the Staff Report's tax on appreciated
corporate assets would effectively fall on the shareholders as transferees. The
shareholders would incur a tax without receiving the cash with which to pay it,
and without the benefit of a step up in basis.
C. Relief Through Shareholder Credit
The ALI Project, unlike the Staff Report, proposes a permanent relief measure
at the shareholder level from the double tax that would result from the repeal
of General Utilities as applied to liquidations. 109 This relief would take the form
of a credit against tax for each shareholder equal to his proportionate share of
corporate tax paid on capital gains recognized in connection with the liquidation,
but not to exceed his own capital gain tax resulting from the liquidation. 110 Were
this proposal in effect, each shareholder would bear the burden of either his own
capital gain tax or his share of the corporate capital gain tax, whichever is
greater. 111 The credit would apply only to corporate capital gains so that inventory
gains would be fully taxed at both the corporate and shareholder levels. 112
The ALI Project concedes that the credit proposal would create some potential
conflict of interest among shareholders concerning the tax treatment of a corporate
disposition. 113 Low basis shareholders would .be able to utilize fully their share
of the credit and would thus prefer a cost basis disposition, whereas high-basis
shareholders might not be able to take full advantage of the credit and would
be likely to prefer a carryover basis disposition. The ALI Project states that it
is unclear whether such a potential conflict is any more or less serious than that
which exists under present law between low basis, high bracket taxpayers, who
would prefer a reorganization, and high basis or tax-exempt shareholders, who
would prefer a cash sale in the event that a purchaser would be willing to pay
anything extra for the resulting step up in basis. 114
The ALI Project does not mention that even if its relief credit proposal were
enacted, a shareholder could be taxed on phantom gain if his stock basis were
equal to the fair market value of the assets distributed but a corporate capital
gain tax were due. In that event, the shareholder would have no economic gain,
108

supra note 15, at 93.
ALI PROJECT, supra note 16, at 135 (proposal C-3). The proposal apparently originated with
Blum, supra note 22, at 522.
110
ALI PROJECT, supra note 16, at 135.
111
/d. at 137.
STAFF REPORT,
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112/d.

113/d.
114/d.
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but still would be subject to his share of corporate tax. The credit would provide
no relief in these situations because no shareholder level capital gain tax would
exist against which to apply the credit. Therefore, shareholder conflict of interest
would be more serious under the ALI Project proposals than under current law.
VII. A PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE SECTION 341
It is possible to avoid the collapsible corporation problem by requiring a
carryover basis in liquidations of corporate inventory and receivables that would
have yielded ordinary income profits to the corporation (hereinafter referred to
as inventory assets). The shareholder who receives inventory assets would recognize the inherent gain upon a subsequent sale or exchange of the low basis
property. A rule should also be added to ensure that gain on inventory assets
always retains its character as ordinary income. 115
A taxable distribution of property in complete liquidation in effect would be
fragmented into two separate liquidations for purposes of allocating basis and
computing gain. One portion would consist of inventory assets and the remainder
of. other property. Section 334(a) would be modified so that inventory assets
would have a carryover basis, but other property would continue to take a fair
market value basis. 116 As under current law, the shareholder distributee would
realize gain equal to the excess of the value of the property distributed over his
basis in the stock. 117 In order to avoid a double tax, however, the (carryover)
basis of inventory assets would be treated as their value for the purpose of
computing shareholder gain. In this way, the excess of fair market value of
inventory assets over their corporate basis would remain untaxed until the assets
were sold or otherwise disposed of, at which time ordinary income tax rates
would apply.
Under this proposal, if the shareholder sells his stock rather than liquidating
the corporation,· he will still receive capital gaiQ treatment. No need will exist
for ordinary income treatment, as is provided by current section 341, unless the
buyer of the stock is in a position to step up the basis of the inventory assets
under section 338. Otherwise, the inventory assets would remain in the corporation with their corporate basis, and the ordinary income tax would be paid in
115
A similar rule exists in the case of partnerships. Section 735(a)(l) provides that gain or loss
on the disposition by a distributee partner of unrealized receivables (as defined under section 751 (c))
received from a partnership shall be considered as ordinary income or loss. Section 735(a)(2) provides
similar treatment for gains or losses realized from the disposition of inventory items (as defined
under 75l(d)) distributed by a partnership if sold or exchanged by the distributee partner within five
years from the date of distribution.
116
Complete carryover of all basis, including that of capital and 1231 assets without recapture,
may also be a preferable treatment to that of current law. Such a scheme was in fact presented in
a House bill in 1954. See H.R .. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 100 CONG. REC. 2957 (1954); see also
Cohen, Gelbert, Surrey, Tarleau & Warren, Corporate Liquidations under the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954," 55 COLUM. L. REV. 37, 38 (1955). The model for liquidations would then be section
351 in reverse, rather than sale of a business. The proposals made here are intended to make the
least changes in the law that will permit repeal of section 341. A complete review of other possibilities
for reform in the area of liquidations is outside the scope of this article.
117
1.R.C. § 33l(a).
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due course. Thus, section 338 will also require amendment as part of this proposal, so that if a deemed asset sale is elected, inventory assets will maintain a
carryover basis even though other assets may be stepped up. 118
Another new rule would be required in order to conform section 337. In
accordance with this proposal, a bulk sale of inventory in a section 337 liquidation
should not continue to produce capital gain to shareholders and a cost basis to
the buyer because the inventory profits would never be taxed at ordinary income
rates. Also, due to the proposed modification of section 338, the tax results of
a liquidation followed by a sale would no longer be the same as for a sale
followed by a liquidation. Therefore, shareholder gain in a section 337 liquidation
should be treated as ordinary income to the extent cash is distributed that represents untaxed corporate profits from the sale of inventory assets.
Fragmentation of sale and liquidation proceeds of an incorporated business
into ordinary income and capital gain will make the tax treatment analogous to
that of dispositions of unincorporated businesses. Similar rules are now in place
for the sale of a business in partnership or proprietorship form. 119 The fragmentation approach is not new even in the corporate liquidation area. In a section
333 liquidation, noncorporate shareholder gain is treated as a dividend to the
extent of accumulated earnings and profits but as capital gain to the extent that
shareholders receive cash or post-1953 stock or securities in excess of earnings
and profits. 120
VIII. EFFECT OF THE PROPOSAL UPON PROBLEMS OF CORPORATE
LIQUIDATIONS

A. Parity of Sections 337 and 338
The proposed carryover rules may seem to create disparity between a sale of
assets, which permits the buyer a cost basis, and a sale of stock accompanied
by a section 338 election, which would require carryover basis of inventory
assets. Large disparities between the results obtained in transactions under sections 337 and 338 may be produced under current law, however, due to the
effect of the recapture provisions which tax the seller in an asset sale, but tax
the buyer in a stock sale. 121 When recapture liability is significant, the seller of
assets will ordinarily negotiate some additional consideration from the buyer to
118
Presumably the parties will adjust the sales price downward to take into account that the buyer
will be paying the tax on the inventory asset appreciation that occurred prior to his purchase.
119
See, e.g., l.R.C. § 751 (partnerships); Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir.
1945) (proprietorship).
1201.R.C. § 333(e). A proposed revision of the income tax by the American Law Institute in 1948
would also have retained General Utilities, repealed section 117(m) of the 1939 Code (predecessor
of section 341), and fragmented certain liquidations and stock sales into ordinary income and capital
gain treatment. The details of that proposal, however, are very different from those made in this
article. See Cohen, Surrey, Tarleau & Warren, A Proposed Revision of the Federal Income Tax
Treatment of the Sale of a Business Enterprise - American Law Institute Draft, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 157 (1954).
121
Section 338(a) treats the target corporation as making a section 337 sale to itself, thus triggering
recapture tax liability to the acquired corporation after ownership has changed hands.
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compensate ·for his tax liability. The same result can be expected under the
proposed carryover rules-. In a section 337 asset sale where there is significant
built-in inventory asset gain, the. shareholders of the selling corporation will
probably attempt to negotiate additional consideration from the buyer to offset
the ordinary income they would recognize under the proposed rules. The buyer
would probably be inclined to agree to pay something more for assets than for
stock in this situation because he would obtain a cost basis in the inventory assets
and thus be relieved of a def~rred tax. liability at ordinary income rates. 122

B . .Tax Adversity and Valuation of Inven~ory
.A new element of tax adv'ersity between buyer and seller would also be
introduced by these rules. Under current law, a bulk sale ~f inventory in a section
337 liquidation produces the same capital gain to shareholders as would a sale
of capital or section 1231 assets. 123 Therefore, th~ seller has no incentive· to
minimize the allocation of purchase price to inventory. The .buyer, however, has
a strong incentive to maximize allocation of the purchase price to inventory .in
order to reduce his future tax on ordinary income profits. Thus, the tax adversity
introduced by the carryover proposal would tend to minimize disputes with th€;
Service over valuation of inventory in asset sales by forcing taxpayers to negotiate
reasonable values at arm's length.
The proposed rules would also alleviate other difficult problems surrounding
the valuation of inventory assets. In an asset purchase or section 338 deemed
asset purchase, the basis of the acquired assets is determined by allocating the
aggregate purchase price in proportion to the respective fair market values of
the acquired assets. 124 The allocation is made, with certain limitations, without
regard for the.capital or ordinary character of the assets. The same rule applies
to section 333 liquidations.
·
This allocation system can have unfortunate results, as seen in the case of
Garrow v. Commissioner. 125 In Garrow, the shareholder distributee in a section
333 liquidation was required to decrease his basis in corporate re,ceivables that
had a·corporate basis and a face value.equal to their fair market value because
certain corporate 'realty had appreciated in value. 126 Accordingly, as a percentage
of total fair market value of all the distributed assets, the v'alue of the receivables
had decreased. Thus, when the shareholder received payments equal to the face
value of the receivables, he was forced to recognize ordinary income equal. to

122 Pllrsuant to the rules o.f Revenue Procedun< 77-12: 1977-1 C.B. 569, valuation of lnventory
must take into account expenses of sale and a reasonable profit on resale in determining what a
reasonable buyer would be willing to pay. In other words, the fair market value of inventory at
wholesale must be significantly less than the retail sales price. Thus, the effective difference between
fair n:iarket value and carryover basis treatment of inventory may often be Jess thari it might at first
appear.
.
123 1.R.C. § 337(b)(2).
124
1.R.C .. § 338(b).
m43 T.C. 890 (1965), ajfd, 368 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1966).
126
/d. at 892-93 ..

Tax Lawyer, Vol. 38, No. 3

686

SECTION OF TAXATION

the excess of the payments over the stepped-down basis of the receivables. 127
This result seems unfair, although inescapable under current Regulations section
l.334-2. 128 Furthermore, it is a one way street in favor of the Treasury. If the
realty in Garrow had decreased in value, the taxpayer would not have been
allowed to allocate basis to receivables in excess of their face value according
to Revenue Ruling 77-456. 129 The same result as in Garrow would probably
arise in ~ section 338 election. 130 This problem would disappear if the inventory
asset carryover proposal is adopted.
Valuation of inventory has caused some difficult problems under current law. 131
When tax adversity exists between buyer and seller, arm's-length negotiation
generally will result in an allocation that will be respected by the courts. 132 No
such tax adversity exists, however, between a deemed buyer and deemed seller
in a section 338 election. Furthermore, there is no tax adversity between a
corporation and its shareholders in liquidation~ under either section 331 or 333.
The inventory valuation problems that exist in these situations would be minimized with a rule requiring carryover of corporate basis in inventory items to
shareholders in a complete liquidation.

C. Tax Benefit Rule
Another beneficial effect of adopting the proposed carryover rules would be
the possibility e>f legislative repeal of the tax benefit rule with respect to corporate
liquidations. This rule has been shrouded in uncertainty 133 since the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Bliss Dairy, lnc. 134 Adoption of the proposed
1211d.
Although section 334(b)(2) was repealed by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982, the Regulations thereunder have not been revoked and appear to remain effective for section
338 elections. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 224(b),
96 Stat. 324, 488-89.
129
1977-2 C.B. 102.
130
See Rev. Ru!. 66-290, 1966-2 C.B. 112.
131
See, e.g .. Jack Daniel Distillery v. United States, 379 F.2d 569 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (liquidation of
unbottled whiskey in bulk valued as if it had valuable Jack Daniel's label and not as unbranded
whiskey on bulk market).
132See, e.g .. Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967).
133
The confusion surrounding the application of the tax benefit rule after the Supreme Court's
decision in Bliss Dairy and its companion case, Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, is well
documented. See, e.g .. Blum, The Role of the Supreme Court in F ederallncome Tax ControversiesHillsboro National Bank and Bliss Dairy, Inc., 61 TAXES 363 (1983); Yin, The Supreme Court's
Tax Benefit Rule Decision: Unanswered Questions Invite Future Litigation, 59 J. TAX'N 130 (1983).
134
460 U.S. 370 (1983). The actual issue in Bliss Dairy was whether, pursuant to the tax benefit
rule, a liquidating corporation must take into income an amount equal to the deductions previously
claimed for the cost of the cattle feed that was distributed to its shareholders in the liquidation. Id.
at 375-76. In Bliss Dairy, the shareholders of the corporation elected a section 333 liquidation, and
the corporation reported no income as a result of the liquidation pursuant to section 336. The Service
argued, however, that under the tax benefit rule, the liquidating corporation was required to recognize
as gross income the value of the cattle feed distributed to its shareholders. Id. at 381. In upholding
the Service's contention, the Supreme Court found that no actual recovery is necessary to invoke
the application of the tax benefit rule. Rather, the Court held that the doctrine applies whenever
there is an event that is "fundamentally inconsistent" with the allowance of the earlier deduction.
Id. at 383.
128
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rule requiring carryover basis in inventory assets distributed pursuant to a corporate liquidation would eliminate. the potential for abusive double deductions
in such situations. If property that has been expensed by the corporation has a
zero basis .that is carried over to shareholders, the shareholders cannot expense
the same property again. Consequently, the tax benefit rule should be in applicable to such distributions. 135
IX. CONCLUSION
The proposed rule to require a carryover basis of inventory assets in corporate
liquidations will accomplish a major purpose of the reformers who would repeal
General Utilities, but in a manner that will not disturb basic principles or introduce new inequities in the tax law. By making only the minimum changes
necessary to ensure that corporate business profits will always be taxed at ordinary
income rates, the collapsible corporation rules can be repealed, the important
principle of General Utilities can be preserved, and a potentially oppressive new
tax on small business can be avoided. Furthermore, the proposed rule will
eliminate some existing problems involving valuation of inventory assets and
also permit repeal of the troublesome rule of Bliss Dairy.

135
See Rev. Rul. 74-396, 1974-2 C.B. 106 (tax benefit rule inapplicable to liquidating distribution
of subsidiary under section 332 where basis of assets is carried over under section 334(b)(l)).
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